Embodied Simulation: Beyond

the Expression/Experience Dualism

of Emotions by Gallese, Vittorio & Caruana, F
Letter
Embodied
Simulation: Beyond
the Expression/
Experience Dualism
of Emotions
Vittorio Gallese1,2,* and
Fausto Caruana1,3,*
In their recent review, Wood et al. [1] argue
that emotion recognition is supported by an
automatic sensorimotor simulation of the
observed expression in one's own motor
system. This proposal recaps the ‘reverse
simulation’ model, previously discussed by
simulation theorists [2], in assuming that
emotion recognition depends on multistep
serial processing. First, the agent expres-
sion is simulated in the perceiver's motor
system. Subsequently, feedback from the
motor system triggers a cascade of neural
activations in other brain regions involved in
the emotional experience, eliciting the cor-
respondent experience in the perceiver.
Finally, this ﬁrst-personal experience is
employed to infer the agent's emotional
state, which is not observable otherwise.
A problem with this model is that it assumes
a dualism between the neural underpin-
nings of emotional experience and expres-
sion, leading to the view that ‘we cannot
directly access another's experience’ ([1],
see p. 236) and that emotion recognition is
a probabilistic ‘game of prediction’. We will
brieﬂy make a case for the notion that this
phenomenological shortcoming could be
avoided by rejecting the experience/
expression dualism characterizing the pro-
posal by Wood et al.
The experience/expression dualism main-
tains that the sensory and motor compo-
nents of emotions are processed by
distinct neural circuits. Wood et al. present
data concerning the neural basis of emo-
tion recognition but they do not present
data concerning the neural basis underlying
the production of emotional expressions.
However, the authors should not be
blamed for this omission. Indeed, the pro-
duction of emotional expressions has been
studied in a restricted number of studies.
Electrical stimulation studies prove that
social emotional facial expressions can
be directly elicited by stimulating a very
wide set of brain regions, extending
beyond the classic motor system. More-
over, what these studies also show is that
distinguishing between sensory and motor
emotional regions in the brain is problem-
atic for two reasons. First, positive emo-
tional expressions can be elicited by
stimulating regions involved in emotional
awareness and semantic memory, such
as the ventral insula [3] and the basal tem-
poral cortex [4], respectively. Second,
emotional experiences such as mirth and
merriment can be evoked by stimulating
frontal areas traditionally deemed to control
motor output, including the pregenual ante-
rior cingulate cortex, the supplementary
motor area, and the inferior frontal gyrus
(see [5]). It follows that the neural systems
supporting emotional production and
experience largely overlap, thus defusing
the experience/expression dualism and
nullifying the need for serial processing in
the emotional brain [6,7].
Evidence shows that recognizing others’
emotion triggers activity in a network largely
overlapping with the one from which emo-
tional expressions/experiences are elicited
by stimulation [8]; lesions of these brain
centers impair emotion recognition and
social behavior [9,10]. This shows that
embodied simulation is not conﬁned to
the sensorimotor system and that emotion
recognition is carried out in shared we-
centric space distributed in the brain [11].
Our suggestion is in accord with the view
that emotional states are relational proper-
ties of an individual within a given social
context more than inaccessible intrinsic
psychological properties of a subject, as
suggested by Wood et al.
The view that emotions are a multifaceted
phenomenon constituted by independent
sensory and motor components is an old
idea that has been formalized in two differ-
ent versions. Some scholars advised that
emotional responses follow the emotional
experiences, in line with the early sugges-
tions by Darwin. Some others run the serial
processing in the opposite direction, con-
sidering emotional responses to be the
trigger of the emotional experience, echo-
ing a perspective dating back to William
James. Wood et al.’s model capitalizes
on both stances. The literature reviewed
above, by contrast, encourages one to
abandon this dichotomous interpretation,
retracing the original criticism that John
Dewey [12] moved against both Darwin's
and James's perspectives: agency is a
core feature of emotional experience and
its behavioral expression is part of the
ontology of some emotions.
In conclusion, while we agree that embod-
ied simulation is a critical tool for under-
standing others’ emotion, we disagree
with narrowing its role to the very ﬁrst
steps of the recognition process. Embod-
ied simulation occurs in a wider network
than the one hypothesized by the authors,
not restricted to the sensorimotor system
and likely sufﬁcient to support intersubjec-
tive recognition without explicit inferential
reasoning. In rejecting the expression/
experience dualism and situating agency
as a core feature of emotional experience,
we rejoin with early theoretical attempts to
uphold the continuity between sensory,
motor, and social aspects of emotions.
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We recently [1] reviewed evidence indicat-
ing that sensorimotor simulation, and
sometimes resulting facial mimicry,
accompanies and supports the percep-
tion of facial expressions of emotion. In
their comment (this issue), Gallese and
Caruana [2] challenge the concept of what
they call ‘expression/experience dualism’
and suggest that emotion experience,
expression production, and expression
recognition are inseparable processes
that take place in a uniﬁed brain network
that encompasses but is not restricted to
sensorimotor systems. We are grateful for
their comment, primarily because Gallese
and colleagues’ own work [3,4] has
inspired much of our thinking on embod-
ied simulation [5]. It also provides us with
the opportunity to clarify our original claims
and ﬁndings, which is the goal of this reply.
Gallese and Caruana's interpretation of
our model of the recognition of facial
expression as relying on ‘multistep serial
processing’ motivated their comment.
However, this is a misinterpretation. When
developing a speciﬁc mechanistic theory,
the linear nature of language sometimes
requires conceptually serial and modular
descriptions. Our Figure 1 may be mis-
leading because it comprises boxes and
arrows, suggesting functional and ana-
tomical separation as well as serial proc-
essing. In fact, we do not assume that
these processes are independent (i.e.,
encapsulated) or serial in nature. This view
is expressed in the ﬁgure legend itself,
where, rather than a dual process, we
indicate that we are illustrating the ‘distrib-
uted and recursive nature of the emotion
perception process, which iteratively
recruits visual, somatosensory, motor,
and premotor cortices, as well as, sub-
cortically, parts of the limbic system and
brainstem’ ([1], see p. 232). We are grate-
ful for the opportunity to make this view
clearer.
Indeed, we agree with Gallese and Car-
uana that emotion production and per-
ception cannot be reduced to a few
cognitive processes or circumscribed
brain areas. Facial expression recognition
is a multifaceted phenomenon that calls
into play a great number of psychological
processes [6]. It requires a wide and dis-
tributed neural network, going beyond the
areas classically implicated in the produc-
tion of facial expressions [7] or in the proc-
essing of facial feedback. We also agree
that emotional expressions and behaviors
are inextricably linked to emotional expe-
rience (e.g., see the section beginning on
p. 230 of our review [1]). Nevertheless, we
do ﬁnd it useful to conceptually separate
the neural systems that plan and execute
motor programs and receive somatosen-
sory feedback from those involved in other
components of emotion. We deliberately
chose not to collapse across the two
phenomena.
Certainly, a feeling and/or a facial expres-
sion can be generated by electrical stimu-
lation (ES) of extrasensorimotor cortices
implicated in emotion processing [8–10],
and this ﬁts with our model. However, the
co-occurrence of the two phenomena
during ES is not convincing evidence that
they are part of a single circuit. Arguably,
some of the reported effects [8–10] do not
arise from the stimulated area (the insula
and basal temporal cortex) itself but from
the effects of ES on more distant areas,
being part of a widespread and highly
interconnected network. Consistent with
this, and as supported by the comment-
ers’ own research, the macaque insula is
likely involved not in the core emotional
response but rather in ‘a more complex
elaboration of emotional stimuli’ [8]. As a
hub of higher-level integration, the insula
thus seems perfectly suited to draw on
basic emotion centers such as the hypo-
thalamus and amygdala on the one hand
and expression-producing and -monitor-
ing motor and somatosensory areas on
the other.
It should also be noted that the authors of
one of the cited studies [9] do not postu-
late an overlap of emotional experience
(mirth) and smile production in the basal
temporal cortex (which they identify as
involved in semantic and language pro-
cesses). Instead, they speculate that ES
of this area may have been transmitted to
the facial motor nuclei via a multisynaptic
tract running through the amygdala and
the limbic system. Furthermore, in their
study smiling preceded feelings of mirth,
suggesting that sensorimotor activity was
induced ﬁrst and subsequently activated
areas underlying the subjective experi-
ence of mirth. This could also explain
why, for many patients, smiling was initi-
ated on the contralateral side from ES in
the anterior cingulate cortex [10]. The
observed asymmetry would be unlikely if
smiling were the result of felt affect. Finally,
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